Michigan Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 5

1946

TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONS-EXPENSES INCURRED IN
THE PURSUIT OF BUSINESS-COMMUTER EXPENSE
Joseph R. Brookshire S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph R. Brookshire S.Ed., TAXATION-INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIONS-EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE
PURSUIT OF BUSINESS-COMMUTER EXPENSE, 44 MICH. L. REV. 882 (1946).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol44/iss5/24

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 44

TAXATION-INCOME TAX-.DEDUCTIONS-EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE
PURSUIT OF BusrnEss-CoMMUTER ExPENSEs-The taxpayer, a lawyer, had
resided in Jackson, Mississippi for approximately thirty-five years, and had maintained a law office there for more .than twenty years. In 1927 he accepted a position ~s general solicitor for a railroad whose main office was in Mobile, Alabama.
Although the taxpayer's work was devoted entirely to the railroad's business, he
refused to abandon his long established connections in Jackson because his position was yearly, appointive, and therefore uncertain. Arrangements were made
with the railroad whereby the taxpayer allocated his time between the two
cities, but also bore the traveling expenses between, and the living expenses in,
both cities. While the taxpayer's main post of business was in Mobile, he worked
most of the time in Jackson during the tax years in question, 1939 and 1940.
He took deductions for the expenses incurred in making seventy-three trips between the cities, and also for the living expenses while in Mobile. The circuit
court 1 reversed the Tax Court's 2 disallowance of the deductions. Certiorari
was granted because of a conflict in lower court deci~ions as to the meaning of
the word "home." Held, whether or not the expenses were incurred while away
from home, they were not incurred in the pursuit of business, and therefore were
not deductible from gross income under Section 2 3 (a) (I) (A) of the Internal
-Revenue Code.8 Commissioner v. Flowers, (U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 250.
While the Supreme Court recognizes that the meaning of the world home
"has engendered much difficulty and litigation," it did not find it necessary to
resolve the conflict among the lower courts. 4 This is unfortunate for the unenlightened. But it also has another result in that it removes any reason for the
Court's discussion of the Dobson rule. 5 The basis of the Tax Court's opinion
is that "the situation presented in this proceeding is, in principle, no different
from that in which a taxpayer's place of employment is in one city and for reasons satisfactory to himself he resides in another." 6 This opinion appears to
revolve around the meaning of "home"; and so the lower court treated it. The

Flowers v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 163.
463 CCH. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. (1946) 1f 19,820.
8 Deductions from gross income include "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including
a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and
lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business .•.."
4 Principal case at 4065. The circuit court in the principal case discarded the
special meaning given the word "home," while in Barnhill v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
4th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 913, the court upheld a tax court decision construing "home"
to mean the taxpayer's place of business.
G In Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239 (1943), it was held
that the Tax Court's findings of fact are not reviewable. Since the Supreme Court
based its decision in the principal case on a different ground than that of the Tax Court,
it is difficult to see what relevance the Dobson rule has to the issue.
6 463 CCH STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. (1946) 1f 19,820.
1

2

RECENT DECISIONS

Supreme Court determines that eyen if a definition of home was implicit in the
Tax Court's opinion, and "even if that was erroneous," the opinion should be
upheld.7 The Court justifies the Tax Court's determination on the ground
that the expenses were not incurred in the pursuit of business. The expenses
"were incurred solely as the result of the taxpayer's desire to maintain a home
in Jackson while working in Mobile, a factor irrelevant to the maintenance and
prosecution of the railroad's legal business." 8 From the language in the Supreme
Court's decision it seems that had the taxpayer made but two or three trips, or
had been employed only for a short time, the expenses would not be deductible
even then. It appears however that the Tax Court does not go this far since it
apparently desires to distinguish the principal case from two other cases which
involved "short-term or temporary employments." 0 The Tax Court theory
appears to be based on the idea that permanent or yearly employment establishes
a home at the place of business. The theory of the Tax Court goes no further
than the facts of this case; on the other hand, the scope of the Supreme Court's
decision is not limited to this case. Nor is this the limit to the uncertainty created
by the principal decision. The Court consistently speaks of the expenses as being
not necessary to the business of the railroad, not in the pursuit of the railroad's
business, and not for the benefit of the railroa'd. The statute is concerned with
deductions of expenses incurred by the taxpayer in carrying on a business. Apparently deductions for expenses have been allowed in numerous cases where
they were neither necessary to the employer's business, nor in pursuit thereof, nor
for the benefit thereof. 10 Where Congress and the Treasury are concerned with
the income of a taxpayer, it appears. that the deductible expenses incurred in procuring that income are the expenses of the procurer, the taxpayer, and not those
of other persons with whom he may have dealings. It seems that the exclusion
of commuting expenses from allowable deductions is not based on a failure to
recognize that in many instances they are necessary, but rather on the administrative and accounting difficulties that might be encountered in cases where taxpayers use their own equipment in going to and from work. It is submitted that
any extension of such non-deductible expenses should be left to legislation by the
appropriate branch of government.

Joseph R. Brookshire, S.Ed.

7 Principal case at 4065. The circuit court held that the Tax Court's determination that this case presented a commuter situation was based on the definition of "home"
as the taxpayer's place of business; the dissent in the principal case held the same.
8 Principal case at 4065 and 4066.
9 463 CCH STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. (1946) ~ 19,820.
1 Colburn v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 763. Harry F.
Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944). In Wallace v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 144 F.
(2d) 407, the special tax meaning given the word "home" was discarded.
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